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The extent of social expenditures in the U.S. and the Nordic Countries is compared in the early 1900s
and again in the early 2000s.  The common view that America spends much less on social welfare
than the Nordic countries does not survive closer inspection when we consider the differences in the
structures of social expenditures.  The standard comparison examines gross social expenditures.  After
adjustments for direct and indirect taxes paid, the net social expenditures in the Nordic countries are
much closer to American levels.  Inclusion of mandatory and private social expenditures raises the
American share of GDP devoted to social expenditures to rank among the middle of the Nordic countries.
Per capita net public social expenditures in the U.S. rank behind only Sweden.  Add in the private
spending, and per capita spending in the U.S. is higher than in all of the Nordic countries.    Finally,
I document the enormous diversity across time and place in public social expenditures in the U.S.









Social Expenditures in the United States and the Nordic Countries:  1900-2003 
Price V. Fishback, University of Arizona 
The United States and the Nordic countries have long been world leaders in rankings 
based on measures of economic success.   Yet, their institutional structures are quite different.   
The U.S. is seen as a capitalist nation with a strong streak of individualism and relatively small 
social spending.  Meanwhile, the Nordic countries are more widely known for their emphasis on 
reallocating a larger share of national income to government social expenditures.    My goal in 
this paper is to document the extent of social spending on health, disability, old age pensions, 
accident disability, and income maintenance in the U.S. and the Nordic countries in the early 
1900s and the early 2000s.  In the early 20
th century Denmark was the leader in social 
expenditures per capita but none of the countries spent much as a percentage of Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) or in terms of real absolute levels.  The Nordic countries adopted several social 
programs earlier than the United States, however, many of these programs covered only a part of 
the population.   
During the modern era, the most commonly cited OECD statistics on public gross social 
expenditures as a share of GDP show large differences between the Nordic countries and the 
U.S.  However, the commonly reported statistics are misleading in several ways.  First, they do 
not take into account the striking differences in taxation of public benefits and tax breaks and tax 
subsidies for low-income people.  Adjustments for tax structure lower the social welfare share of 
GDP in the Nordic countries and raise it in the United States.  Second, the share of GDP only 
tells part of the story because per capita GDP in the United States is higher than in the Nordic 
countries. Comparisons of publicly mandated social welfare spending adjusted for purchasing 
power parity in both 1995 and 2003 show that the amount the U.S. spends ranks in the midst of 4 
 
 
the Nordic countries.  Third, the U.S. system relies much more heavily on private provision of 
health and disability insurance, retirement pensions, and charitable distributions to the poor than 
do the Nordic countries.  After accounting for this voluntary private social expenditure, the U.S. 
in 2003 had higher net social expenditures as a share of GDP than all of the Nordic countries 
except Sweden.  Since the U.S. GDP per capita is higher, U.S. net social expenditures per capita 
in 2003 were more than $1000 higher than Sweden, which was the highest among the Nordic 
countries. 
Finally, the U.S. aggregate social spending disguises a great deal of variation across the 
states within the U.S.  The U.S. is a federal system and many of the public benefits in the social 
welfare programs are determined at the state level.  To truly understand developments in the 
U.S., therefore, you must examine the variation across the states.  Prior to the 1930s nearly all 
public social welfare spending was the responsibility of local governments with some activity by 
the states.   I document the extent of the various programs using state and city level data in the 
1920s and then examine the extent of path dependence in the ranking of the states in terms of 
their spending on various types of benefits.  There is some evidence that there was significant 
path dependence before Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal expanded the federal government’s role 
in social welfare programs in the 1930s.  There were major shifts in the relative rankings of the 
states between 1930 and 1940.  Changes in the rankings have continued to this day, as shown by 
the low correlations in workers’ compensation benefits paid to injured workers in 1940 relative 
to 1990.    
Social Expenditures, 1880 to 1930 
  The most obvious feature of social expenditures at the turn of the 20
th century was how 
much smaller they were in comparisons with the levels at the turn of the 21
st century.   Peter 5 
 
 
Lindert (1994, 2004) performed yeoman work in developing estimates of government social 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP for the years 1880 to 1930.   Throughout the paper, I will 
follow Lindert in using the OECD definitions of “social expenditures.”
1  The social expenditures 
include old-age pensions, survivor benefits (but not from private life insurance), incapacity-
related aid, health expenditures, aid to families, unemployment benefits, government job 
training, housing subsidies, and income maintenance.  Table 1 shows his estimates for the U.S. 
and the Nordic Countries.   In 1880 all five countries have government social spending of 
roughly one percent of national income or less.  Denmark leads the way in expanding spending 
as it rises across time up to 3.4 percent.  Most of the expansions in spending in the other Nordic 
countries occurred in the 1920s.    The timing of the expansions relates to some extent to the 
timing of the adoption of the social welfare programs in the Nordic states in Table 2.  Despite the 
adoption of the programs that eventually became much larger, the amount of spending as a share 
of GDP stayed relatively low because they tended to cover the relatively small nonfarm sector of 
the economies and some were voluntary in their early years.
2   The very rough estimates of per 
                                                 
1The OECD definition of social expenditures is the “provision by public and private institutions of 
benefits to, and financial contributions targeted at households and individuals in order to provide support 
during circumstances which adversely affect their welfare, provided that the provision of the benefits and 
financial contributions constitutes neither a direct payment for a particular good or service nor an 
individual contract or transfer. “  “Social benefits include cash benefits (e.g., pensions, income support 
during maternity leave, and social assistance payments), social services (e.g., childcare, care for the 
elderly and disabled) and tax breaks with a social purpose (e.g. tax expenditures towards families with 
children, or favourable tax treatment of contributions to private health plans.”  In further discussion, the 
OECD says that “social spending does not include remuneration for work, as it does not cover market 
transactions, i.e., payments in return for the simultaneous provision of services of equivalent value.  
Employer costs such as allowances toward transport, holiday pay, etc. are part of remuneration in this 
sense.”  (OECD 2007,  7-8). 
2 For examples with respect to health insurance, see Winegarden and Murray 1998. 6 
 
 
capita social spending in 1990 dollars in Table 3 show that the leader Denmark was spending 
only $182 per capita while the United States trailed the pack at $35 per capita.  
 Lindert (1994) confines his measures to social spending by governments, and thus 
government mandates for private social spending and private social spending are not included.   
Based on this focus for the period 1880 to 1930, Bizmarck’s Germany loses its place as the 
leader in providing social insurance because the German government established mandates for 
social insurance but did not fund it.   
In my view Lindert’s emphasis on government spending in the 1880 to 1930 comparisons 
is too narrow in assessing how societies deal with these social issues.   A government mandate to 
require sickness, accident and old age insurance is a method for the society to deal with the issue.   
The mandates force people to create insurance pools that deal with these issues and remove the 
possibility that someone will end up on the government dole.  Consider workers’ compensation 
programs in the United States in the 1910s.  A few states had state monopoly workers’ 
compensation insurance that collected premiums from employers that funded the payment of 
accident benefits.  Many other states mandated that employers fund the coverage but the 
employers paid the premiums to private insurers.  In some states the employers could choose to 
buy private or state insurance coverage for their workers.  An exclusive focus on government 
programs requires that we count the premiums paid to state funds but not the private workers’ 
compensation insurance.  Yet both types of programs provide accident benefits to injured 
workers and they both require that the employer fund the benefits.   
Consider U.S. unemployment insurance.  This is considered a government program under 
Lindert’s definition because it is “run” by state governments even though it is funded almost 
entirely by employer contributions.  In the U.S. the federal government provides less than 3 7 
 
 
percent of the total funding for administrative costs and the rest of the funding comes from the 
employers.  Is this really different from the workers’ compensation mandates?  In a world where 
wages adjust to amenities and disamenities in the workplace, it does not make that much 
difference if the employer or the worker makes the contributions to the funds.   For example, 
even though the contributions in the U.S. to fund social security old-age pensions are split 50-50, 
most economists believe that the employer passes the cost on to the worker almost fully in the 
form of lower wages.  Even in the early 1900s, Fishback and Kantor (2000, 1995) find that 
nonunion workers essentially paid for the bulk of the improved accident benefits they received 
under workers’ compensation through indirect adjustments to wages in labor markets.  A series 
of studies summarized in Fishback (1998) found evidence of compensating wage differentials in 
the U.S. for other aspects of the workplace. 
A focus on government programs misses a significant part of the rise in private social 
welfare spending during this period in the United States.  John Murray (2008) documents the rise 
in sickness insurance, which paid people for lost time worked, as well as the explicit rejection of 
state sickness insurance in every state.  A number of industries began offering pensions and there 
were a broad range of labor unions, fraternal societies, and other organizations offering various 
forms of life insurance, sickness insurance, and accident insurance (Emery and Emery 1999, 
Murray 2008, Fishback and Kantor 2000, Clark, Craig, and Wilson 2003).   
Lindert (1994) recognized that focusing on government social expenditures missed a 
significant amount of the provision of transfer payments to the poor, but I want to emphasize it 
further in the American case.  Private spending on income maintenance for the poor accounted 
for 67 percent of total transfers from private and public sources in Massachusetts in 1903, 1920, 
and 1930.   In 1930 private spending on income maintenance for the poor was 1.4 percent 8 
 
 
relative to state personal income, while public spending was 0.7 percent (Livingston, 2009).   
Even though Massachusetts was at the high end of public poverty payments relative to other 
states, the point here is that a focus only on government transfers misses a substantial amount of 
social expenditures. 
 Another reason the private and public distinctions might be de-emphasized is based on 
the nature of subsidies across different parts of the income distribution.   The family allowance 
programs started by the Nordic countries soon after World War II are primary examples.  All 
families receive a base payment for children, including families in the upper tiers of the income 
distribution.  In contrast, the United States does not have such a broad-based payment program 
because the emphasis is on providing payments to families in the lower tier of the income 
distribution.   It should be noted, however, that child credits in the income tax system provide a  
subsidy to the upper and middle class tax payers.   This raises a philosophical question about the 
meaning of the OECD social expenditures overall.  If we see the social expenditures as providing 
a safety net for people, should we really be counting government transfers to the upper and 
middle tiers of the income distribution as social protection expenditures, when such households 
can easily handle the costs of raising children without such subsidies?       
The issue of old-age pensions highlights another difficulty for cross-country 
comparisons.  As seen in Table 2, Denmark established old-age pensions in 1891 and Sweden 
did so in 1913.  In maintaining consistency, Lindert (1994) decided to eliminate military 
pensions from his comparisons.   This makes sense when we consider that disability and 
retirement pensions paid to soldiers can be treated as part of the rewards structure for serving in 
the military.  On the other hand, these are income maintenance programs for workers in the 
economy just like workers’ compensation and disability programs would be.    9 
 
 
Closer study of the U.S. military pensions raises another issue.  Theda Skocpol (1992) 
and Ann Orloff (1993, 134-7)  argue that the disability pensions for Civil War veterans became 
essentially a shadow social security system in the United States outside the south.  The U.S. 
Congress changed the eligibility rules in ways that treated old-age as a disability and provided 
survival benefits for widows.  As a result, roughly 40 to 48 percent of the elderly in the North 
and Midwest in the early 1900s were receiving pensions in the early 1900s through the system 
(Fishback and Thomasson 2006, 2-703, note 4).   With so many elderly covered, it likely altered 
the political calculus in ways that delayed the adoption of old-age assistance and pensions in the 
United States for a decade or two.    
These are all U.S. examples that cause a focus on government programs in the early 
1900s to understate what I consider to be the true size of social expenditures.  I am sure that the 
same issues arise in the Nordic countries as well, and I have not yet explored them.  To the 
extent that the relative share of government mandates and private social expenditures was the 
same in the early 1900s as the share in the modern period described below, the estimates 
focusing on government social expenditures understate the U.S. expenditures more than the 
expenditures by the Nordic countries.     
  Even after making adjustments to Lindert’s estimates, government social spending in all 
of these countries was a very small share of GDP.  There are two major compositional reasons 
that can account for a great deal of the rise in social expenditures over the 20
th century in these 
countries:  the rise in spending on health and the increase in the share of elderly in the 
population. 
 Unlike today, there were relatively small expenditures on health care because health care 
technologies were nowhere nearly as effective as they are today.  The medical profession could 10 
 
 
perform a limited range of effective operations, set bones, and provide painkillers and nursing 
services to ease pain and discomfort to a limited degree.  There were effective vaccines that 
prevented most diseases and these were relatively inexpensive.  Doctors essentially price 
discriminated across patients in ways that subsidized the poor.  Expenditures on doctor care were 
small enough that the primary form of insurance sold by companies, run by fraternal societies, 
and government’s like Germany were income replacement plans.  Not until the late 1930s in 
America do we see the development of plans designed to pay for medical expenditures.  Health 
insurance, designed to pay doctor’s fees, really does not take off until the 1940s and 1950s 
(Thomasson 2002).  By that time new medical technologies had opened the door to high 
expenditures by making many procedures available to people that were impossible before but 
now had a cost that someone could pay.  Health expenditures currently account for roughly one-
third of government social expenditures in the U.S. and about one-fifth to one-fourth in the 
Nordic countries.   The U.S. has seen a tripling of health expenditures (private and public) as a 
share of GDP since 1960 from 5 percent to over 15 percent in 2005, while Finland has seen a 
doubling from 3.8 percent in 1960 to over 8 percent in 2005. 
3 
Another major change is the dramatic rise in the number of the elderly.  When the 
countries committed to providing public pensions for the elderly, the share of elderly over aged 
65 was dramatically lower.  In the United States in 1900, people aged 65 and over accounted for 
only 4.1 percent of the population, compared to 12.2 percent in 2000.  The Nordic countries also 
experienced substantial rises over the same period:  Denmark from 7 to 15 percent, Finland 5 to 
15, Norway 8 to 15, and Sweden 8 to 16 (Sundstrom 2009, 98).  The shares in the Nordic 
                                                 
3Percentages derived from OECD Health Statistics downloaded from OECD Health statistics database on July 15, 
2009.  http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=HEALTH. 11 
 
 
countries in 2000 are even higher, ranging from 14.9 percent in Finland to 15.3 percent in 
Sweden.  The share of population aged 80 and higher in 2000 was 3.4 in Finland and the U.S. 
and 4 percent or higher in the remaining Nordic countries.  As a result, elderly pensions account 
for roughly one-third of government social expenditures in the U.S. in 2003 and roughly one-
fourth to one-third in the Nordic countries.
4  The point made here is purely a mechanical point 
that the elderly as a share of the population mechanically raises the share of social expenditures.  
Lindert (1994, 2004, 183-185) shows that countries with more elderly tend to have higher social 
expenditures aside from ones related to old-age.   He tentatively argues that interest in safety nets 
and security in the political arena tends to rise with the share of elderly in the population.   
 
The Modern Era 
  Most studies in the modern era that compare U.S. and European spending on social 
welfare start and end with the information in the top panel of Table 4, which shows estimates of 
the amount of PUBLIC social welfare spending as a percentage relative to GDP.  It is not truly a 
share of GDP because much of the spending is in the form of transfer payments, which do not 
change GDP.   These are the numbers that are routinely reported in the OECD data bases and in 
their publications and therefore are the ones easily at hand whenever someone searches the 
internet.  The figures suggest that the Nordic countries have far larger social expenditures than 
the United States for aiding people with health care, disability, poverty relief, and pension 
benefits to the disadvantaged.  In the 1990s and the early 2000s, Sweden’s relative percentage 
                                                 
4 Percentages derived from OECD Health Statistics downloaded from OECD Health statistics database on July 15, 




was 35 to 37, compared with roughly 32 in Denmark, 27 in Norway, and 25.7 in Finland.  The 
U.S. lags well behind with roughly 17 percent.   
  The gross spending data do not capture the fact that beneficiaries of social expenditures 
pay different amounts of taxes on their benefits in the various countries.   For example, in 2003 
people receiving old-age cash public pensions in Sweden paid an average itemized tax rate of 
28.6 percent on the benefits received, while in the U.S. the tax rate on social security benefits 
was 5.2 percent.  The Swedes receiving unemployment benefits paid a tax rate of 28.7 percent on 
their benefits, while Americans paid 12 percent.    The Swedish benefit recipients then turned 
around and paid taxes on their consumer purchases of between 22 and 28.8 percent, while 
Americans paid 4.7 to 7 percent.  Finally, the U.S. offers a wide of tax breaks that are similar to 
cash benefits--like the earned income tax credit for low-income workers with families--and tax 
deductions and breaks for medical expenses, pensions and to stimulate charitable giving and 
other private social protection.  Many are not found in Swedish tax laws.
5  
  When the taxes paid are subtracted from the social transfers and the tax breaks are added 
to them, net public spending as a percentage relative to GDP falls sharply in many of the Nordic 
countries, while the U.S. percentage rises slightly.   The middle panel of Table 4 shows that 
Sweden’s net public social expenditure in 2003 is 28.8 percent relative to GDP, 8.3 percentage 
points below its gross percent of 37.1 percent.  Meanwhile, the U.S. net public expenditure 
percentage relative to GDP is 18.6, up slightly from the gross spending of 17.4 percent.   
                                                 
5The average itemized tax rates Sweden and America are 28.6 for old-age cash benefits, 28.3 for survivors benefits, 
27.7 to 30.8 for incapacity related benefits, 30.8 for family cash benefits, 29.6 for benefits while in labor market 
training and 29.8 on unemployment insurance benefits.   In the U.S. social security benefits are taxed at 5.2 percent, 
unemployment compensation at 12.1, and Pension and IRA distributions at 14.8.  See OECD 2007, 78, 80.   13 
 
 
  The other feature that is ignored, explicitly or implicitly, is the dramatic difference in 
philosophy toward social expenditures in the countries.  The Nordic countries are more focused 
on providing the same basic benefit to everybody, while the U.S. focus is on providing benefits 
once someone is in trouble.  This is most obvious in the health care system where the Nordic 
countries provide a basic national health care system run by some combination of the state and 
employers.  Denmark and Finland also have some private insurance.   Meanwhile, in the U.S., 
health insurance and health care is privately funded, largely through employers.  Someone 
without health insurance still has access to health care, but only if their income is below a set 
amount relative to the poverty line.   The two systems lead to quite different amounts of private 
social expenditures.  In 2003 the U.S. had voluntary private health expenditures of 5.6 percent 
relative to GDP compared with 0.2 percent in Finland, 0.1 in Denmark and nearly zero in 
Norway and Sweden (OECD 2007, p. 23).  Similarly, private pension payouts are 3.8 percent 
relative to GDP in the U.S. compared with 2.2 percent in Denmark, 2 percent in Sweden, and 
less than one percent in Finland and Norway.  When the private social expenditures are added to 
the totals in the bottom panel of Table 4, the U.S. is ranked in the middle of the Nordic countries.  
By 2003 Sweden was still leading the way with net social expenditures of 30.9 percent relative to 
GDP, followed by the U.S. at 27 percent and the remaining Nordic countries in the 23 to 25 
percent range.   
  The comparisons of social expenditure to GDP are often used because they give a sense 
of the share of income the countries are willing to devote to social expenditures.  Yet a country 
with higher GDP per capita could have a lower percentage of social expenditures relative to GDP 
and still be spending more in absolute amounts per person in the country.   This is the case in 
comparisons between the U.S. and Nordic countries, because the U.S. has a higher per capita 14 
 
 
GDP.   If we focus only on net public spending per capita in the middle panel of Table 5, the 
U.S. by 2003 is spending $5,408 (in 1990 purchasing power parity dollars), which is below the 
spending in Sweden of $6,259 and Norway at $5901, about the same as the $5,408 spent by 
Denmark $5408 and more than Finland’s $4,232. 
Add in the private spending at the bottom of Table 5 and the U.S. in 2003 is leading the 
group with expenditures of $7,580.  Sweden spends roughly $1100 less at $6,715, followed by 
Norway ($6,315), Denmark ($5,818), and Finland ($4,920).   These spending figures clearly 
show that the Nordic countries and the U.S. are rich countries.  The U.S. and Sweden are 
spending more per capita on social expenditures alone than the $6,459 in per capita GDP earned 
throughout the world (Maddison dataset 2009).  Social expenditures in each of the Nordic 
countries exceed GDP per capita in many of the countries that formed the former USSR.   As is 
always the case, some large bounds should be put on all of these estimates given the difficulties 
of comparing purchasing power across countries. 
Americans spend a higher share of GDP on health care than people in the Nordic 
countries.  In 2003, the U.S. spent 5.6 percent relative to GDP through government and another 
5.6 percent privately.  Both percentages are higher now.   In comparison, the Nordic countries 
spent between 8 and 10 percent of GDP.
6   Some might claim that the private share is bloated by 
higher administrative costs.   Comparisons of the official statistics on the administrative costs of 
public versus private programs hide two key features that business insurance scholars note.  First, 
the public plans do not have to hold large reserve funds as a private insurer does because the 
                                                 
6 (OECD Health Statistics downloaded from OECD Health statistics database on July 15, 2009 
http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=HEALTH).  The government expenditures largely went to fund 
Medicare for the elderly (42.3 percent based on 1997 estimates), Medicaid for the poor nonelderly (31.5 percent) 
and some additional programs for the poor and government employees (26.2 percent. 15 
 
 
public plans have the option of turning to the taxpayer when the health insurance taxes do not 
cover health insurance expenditures.  There are no easy ways to estimate the hidden costs of this 
reliance on taxpayers as the backstop, but they are likely to be similar in size to the private plans 
costs.  Second, the private plans are more active and successful at limiting fraudulent activity 
than the public plans.  Catching fraud costs resources while fraud itself wastes resources.  This 
has two conflicting effects on comparisons of expenditures under private and public plans.  The 
public expenditures are likely to be larger than under private health plans to the extent that the 
public programs overpay for fraudulent claims.  On the other hand, the spending by public 
programs is likely to be lower than under private health plans to the extent the public programs 
spend less on detecting fraud.   
  Say we ignore the hidden administrative costs for government programs.  What would be 
the implications for the comparisons of social insurance expenditures in Table 4 and 5 if we 
assumed that high private administrative costs inflated American health spending?  To make the 
following comparison robust, we should overstate the difference in administrative costs between 
private and public health insurance funds.  One-third of private insurance premiums paid 
typically go to administrative costs.  Assume that all of this is excessive and that government 
insurance has no administrative costs.   To eliminate excessive administrative costs, we should 
reduce the 5.6 percent relative to GDP spent in the U.S. on private health expenditures by one-
third, which comes to a reduction of 1.87 percent relative to GDP.  This cut in private health 
expenditures would cut the U.S. net social expenditures relative to GDP in the bottom of Table 4 
from 27 percent to 25.1 percent, which is about the share in Denmark.  The adjustment would 
cause the U.S. net per capita social expenditures in the bottom of Table 5 from $7,850 to $7,307, 
which would still leave the U.S. ranked first in terms of social spending per capita.    We could 16 
 
 
take a further step and assume that the bloat in the American system is two-thirds of the private 
spending on health care.  At that point, U.S. per capita net public and private social expenditures 
would approximately equal Sweden’s expenditures of $6,700.     
What these comparisons highlight is that all of the countries spend extensively on social 
welfare, but that the U.S. and Nordic countries go about doing it in quite different ways.  The 
Nordic countries tend to provide benefits to all members of society at all income levels and 
consequently collect a large share of income in taxes.  Meanwhile, the United States follows a 
strategy more focused on nongovernment provision of many social welfare activities, while 
providing income, health, and in-kind benefits for the poor.   The main question about the U.S. 
social safety net is how well it covers the poor population.  The focus in the United States has 
long been on children and their families, the elderly, and the disabled.  Single adults who have 
not been working face more haphazard coverage in the form of local payments.   
The safety net in the U.S. is probably more porous than in the Nordic countries.  The 
most commonly cited problem is the absence of private or public health insurance for 
approximately 15 percent of the American population at any point in time (as of 2005 and 2006, 
see U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2007).  Access to health insurance is relatively fluid, as people 
move in and out of coverage, so that the number who are not covered throughout the year is 
more like 8 to 12 percent (Congressional Budget Office, 2003).  But this statistic does not imply 
the absence of medical care.   Some of the lack of health insurance is likely voluntary choices by 
healthy people who can afford health insurance but choose to pay as they go rather than pay the 
$5,000 to $6,000 per year for health insurance for an individual.   They are gambling that they 
will be among the very large share of the healthy population at the beginning of the year that 
does not experience a severe medical problem that year.   The premiums give a pretty good 17 
 
 
picture of the combination of the odds of having a severe problem multiplied by the costs of that 
problem.  Nearly 60 percent of the uninsured are aged 18 to 44, where health risks are less dire, 
while 35 percent are in households earning over $50,000 per year.
7  Others without health 
insurance also receive care in emergency rooms.  A number of health providers provide health 
care in ways that can be missed by official statistics (Bovbjreg, et. al. 2006).     
The safety net is the U.S. is porous in another way, as many who are eligible for benefits 
do not apply for them.  A significant proportion of the working poor who are eligible for the 
earned income tax credit, which offers substantial tax rebates and subsidies to the working poor 
with families, do not file the required income tax returns to obtain the benefits.  As a result, the 
United Way charity has developed programs to aid the working poor in filing tax returns.  A 
recent New York Times article summarized a series of studies that showed that significant shares 
of the eligible poor are either not applying for benefits or not getting them (DeParle 2009).    The 
reasons vary from dealing with the complexities of welfare applications to lack of information to 
unwillingness to go through the process for fear the government might interfere with their lives. 
 Certainly, an important feature of any society is how it treats the people in the lower 
portion of the income distribution.   Poverty researchers constantly debate whether poverty 
should be measured relative to others in the same country or should be measured on an absolute 
basis.  The Gini coefficients, which show relative poverty within the same country, are shown for 
the various countries before and after taxes and transfers are taken into account in Table 6.  The 
income distribution before taxes and transfers in the United States was slightly more equal than 
                                                 
7 Meanwhile, over the past decade the income levels at which children are eligible for government subsidized health 
insurance through the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) have risen to double the poverty line of in many 
states (The federal poverty line for a family of four in 2009 is $22,050  see 
http://ccf.georgetown.edu/index/eligibility-schip ). 18 
 
 
Sweden and less equal than Finland in the mid 1970s.  The income distributions before taxes and 
transfers all became more unequal over time, as the Gini coefficient rose above .39 in each 
country.  By the mid-2000s the U.S. distribution was the most unequal of all of the countries. 
One purpose of taxes and transfers is to realign the income distribution.  Comparisons of 
the lower half with the upper half of Table 6a and the changes in Table 6b show that the income 
distributions after taxes and transfers are substantially more equal than the distribution before 
taxes and transfers.  The taxes and transfers had much stronger effects on the income distribution 
in the Nordic countries than in the U.S.  In the Nordic countries after the mid-1980s, the Gini 
coefficients in Table 6a dropped from above 0.39 before taxes and transfers to below 0.28 after 
taxes and transfers.  Taxes and transfers had much smaller effects on the U.S. income 
distribution with a shift in the Gini from above 0.45 to under 0.38 in the same years.   Similarly, 
in Table 6b the shares of people with income below 40 percent of the median income in the 
country are cut sharply in all countries by adjustments through direct transfers and taxes.  Again, 
the U.S adjustments for taxes and transfers have a smaller effect than in the Nordic countries.  In 
all five countries the income distribution after taxes and transfers has become more unequal over 
time.    
Absolute levels of poverty deserve strong consideration as well because the world 
economy is increasingly global and people compare themselves not only with their close 
neighbors but with people throughout the world.  Timothy Smeeding (2005, pp. 957, 960) used 
the Luxembourg income study to develop estimates of the disposable income of the poor in each 
country relative to the median income in the United States in the year 2000.   Disposable income 
in the study includes earned income from wages, salaries, and self-employment; other cash 
income from private sources, including property, pensions, alimony, and child support; public 19 
 
 
transfer payments for retirement, family allowances, unemployment compensation and welfare 
benefits.  Income taxes and Social Security contributions are deducted.  Not included in the 
measure are capital gains, imputed rents, home production or in-kind income.  Also no account is 
taken for indirect taxes like consumption taxes or the benefits from public spending on social 
goods like healthcare, education or most housing subsidies.  As in the other studies discussed 
above, he adjusted the values for purchasing power parity, and the usual caveats about the 
problems with purchasing power parity apply.    
Table 7 shows the incomes per equivalent person in 2000 in year 2000 dollars for people 
in households at the 10
th percentile and at the 90
th percentile in each country.   The figures for 
income show that the poor in the U.S. were receiving incomes after taxes and transfers at roughly 
the same level as the poor in Finland and Sweden.  To be more precise, Finnish people in 
households at the 10
th percentile of the Finnish income distribution had incomes of roughly 
$9,300 by this measure, as did Swedes in the 10
th percentile of Swedish households.  Americans 
in the 10
th percentile of American households earned about $9,500.
8   There is a stark contrast at 
the upper end of the distribution.  Americans in households in the 90
th percentile of the American 
distribution were earning $51,300 per equivalent person in the household, nearly double what 
Swedes in the 90
th percentile of the Swedish distribution were earning and what Finnish people 
in the 90
th percentile of the Finnish distribution were earning.  People at the 10
th percentile in 
income in the U.S. and the Nordic countries fare well relative to averages in the rest of the world 
and in the past.  In the year 2000 the $9,300 earnings are in the same range as per capita income 
in Mexico, Hungary, and Turkey and higher than the per capita incomes of countries accounting 
                                                 
8 Being at the 10
th percentile implies that the person at the 10
th percentile has a higher income than 9.9999 percent of 
the population and lower income than 90 percent of the population.   20 
 
 
for more than 79 percent of the world’s population.  The $8,350 figure for a single person in the 
year 2000 is 31 percent higher than per capita GDP in America in 1929, and higher than per 
capita income in America as late as 1941 on the verge of World War II.
9 
The holes in the safety net in the U.S. create major problems for people below the 10
th 
percentile in the income distribution in the United States.  In Smeeding’s (2005) study he noted 
that a significant share of children in one-parent households fared much worse than the 10
th 
percentile comparison suggested.  Figure 1 from a recent OECD (2008) study of income 
inequality shows the average income per person in 2005 U.S. dollars for each decile of the 
disposable income distribution.  The OECD study used roughly the same definition of disposable 
income used by Smeeding although they appear to have weighted people in each household 
differently.
10   The bottom line on the rectangle for the U.S. in the far right of the Figure shows 
that the average disposable income for people in the bottom 10 percent of the income distribution 
was roughly $6,000 in the mid-2000s.  The next higher line in the rectangle, roughly $12,000, is 
the average income of the people between the 10
th and 20
th percentile.  The top of the rectangle 
shows that the average income for the people in the top 10 percent of the distribution was 
approximately $94,000.   Finally, the diamond shows the average per capita income of roughly 
$33,000 in the U.S.   
Note that Smeeding’s study focused on the people right at the 10
th percentile, while the 
OECD study looks at the average for all of the people ranked below the 10
th percentile.  Thus the 
                                                 
9 The $17,050 figure for a family of four compares to average annual earnings of $13,209 in year $2000 for 
manufacturing workers in 1929, $14,289 in year $2000 in 1939, and $19,826 in 1949.  Annual earnings were 
calculated from series Dd5 and Dd8 in Carter.et al. 2006, volume 4, p. 579 and then adjusted to year 2000 dollar 
from Officer and Williamson, 2009.   
10 Smeeding used equivalence scales which counts children as having smaller weights than adults, while the OECD 
gave equal weighting to all persons using the square root of the number of people in the household. 21 
 
 
difference between the two figures is driven by what happens below the 10
th percentile.  The 
group in the bottom in the U.S. does not fare well relative to the Nordic countries, as the U.S. 
average is $5,800 in 2005 compared with averages in the Nordic countries that range from 
$8,000 in Finland to $12,000 in Norway.   The one advantage the poor Americans would have 
had in spending their disposable income is that they face consumption tax rates in the 4 to 7 
percent range, while consumption taxes in the Nordic countries are above 20 percent.   On the 
other hand, the public services not counted in disposable income, like health care and education, 
likely are better for the very poor in the Nordic countries than in the United States.   One sign is 
the lower infant mortality rates in the Nordic countries than in the United States.   
 
Variation Across Jurisdictions in the U.S.   
  Comparisons of U.S. aggregates with those in other countries miss the tremendous 
variation in income and social welfare spending income across states within the United States.  
Since the Nordic countries are roughly the size of large U.S. states, it is interesting to see how 
the Nordic countries fared relative to the various U.S. states on a series of dimensions.
 11  Figures 
2 and 3 show where the Nordic countries fit in terms of per capita income and per capita income 
growth between 1920 and 2000.   The two figures show that in terms of per capita income and 
income growth the Nordic countries look most like states in the American South.   Finland and 
Norway grew the most rapidly of any of the economies with Sweden, Mississippi, North 
Carolina, Georgia, and Tennessee the next in the growth rankings in Figure 2.  Finland’s per 
                                                 
11 Ranking the Nordic countries among the American states in terms of population in 2000, Sweden would rank 9
th, 
Denmark, 20th, Finland 22
nd, and Norway 25
th.  Sweden has a population similar to New Jersey, Denmark is like 




th, and Norway 16
th  among the U.S. states.  In population terms Sweden most 
resembled Ohio, Denmark and Finland were similar to New Jersey, and Norway was most like Wisconsin. 22 
 
 
capita income in 2000 was an incredibly high 12.6 times larger than it was in 1920.  Part of this 
rapid growth is driven by the lower levels of income in these economies in both 1920 and 2000.  
As seen in Figure 3, the Nordic countries and southern states remain in the lower portion of the 
distribution in both 1920 and 2000.   
 Income does not tell the whole story, however.  Infant mortality rates give a sense of the 
health of the most vulnerable age group in the population.  They also give a sense of the relative 
welfare of the poor in the economies, because high infant mortality rates are generally associated 
with poverty.  The infant mortality rates for Norway and Sweden ranked among the 10 lowest 
rates for the economies in 1921.  Denmark ranked in the middle of the pack and Finland had one 
of the highest rates of any of the locations.   By the early 2000s infant mortality rates had fallen 
below 11.5 per thousand in every one of the areas.  The Nordic countries had four of the five 
lowest infant mortality rates in the distribution.   
  The dramatic differences in income and infant mortality are matched by substantial 
variation in social expenditures at the state and local level.  Figures 5a and 5b show two different 
rough estimates of welfare expenditures per capita in 1990 dollars for 248 cities.  Figure 5a 
includes welfare spending that is calculated by adding together per capita spending by city 
government and per capita spending by state government institutions on indoor and outdoor aid 
to the poor, care of children, care of the deaf, blind, and mute, and mothers’ pensions.  This 
assumes that the state spending is distributed across rural and city areas in the same way that the 
population was distributed.  The figure understates the spending to the extent that county 
governments and special districts contributed to welfare spending and it also misses the extent of 
spending on state workers’ compensation.  Figure 5b includes per capita information on 23 
 
 
compensation of workers killed or injured on the job and their families.  Administration costs 
and payments for medical care of the injured workers are not included.   
The very rough estimates of per capita government welfare spending in 1990 dollars for 
280 cities in Figure 5 range from 45 cents to $29 in 1923 and from 71 cents to $56 in 1930.  
When workplace accident compensation is added to the figure, the per capita spending ranges 
from $3.24 to $92 in 1923 and $4.19 to $116.6 in 1930.      
  Over the course of the 1920s in both graphs there was a clear sense of path dependence in 
the per capita welfare spending, as shown by the clustering of observations around the positive 
diagonal slopes in Figure 5a and Figure 5b.   The spending per capita across cities around 1930 
was influenced not only by the prior spending per capita in 1923 but also changes in employment 
the labor market.  Table 9 shows regressions run on a subset of the spending, per capita city 
government spending on care of the poor and veterans.  The regression shows the results of 
regressions of the natural log of per capita city government spending in 1929 (and 1931) on the 
natural log of the same spending in 1923 and the change in the natural log of state manufacturing 
employment between 1923 and 1929 (1931).   The coefficients can be read as elasticities.  The 
strong path dependence is still there after controlling for changes in employment.  Cities with per 
capita relief spending one percent higher in 1923, holding other things constant, tended to have 
per capita spending in 1929 and in 1939 that was 0.93 and 0.94 percent higher, respectively.   Per 
capita welfare spending responded strongly to offset drops in the natural log of employment.  
The negative elasticity implies that a one percent reduction in the change in the log of 
employment led to an increase in per capita relief spending of 1.48 percent in 1929 and 2.52 
percent in 1931.   24 
 
 
To compare the U.S. city and state government welfare spending with the Nordic 
countries, estimates of per capita welfare and unemployment spending from the Nordic countries 
based on Lindert (1994, 11)  were added to Figures 5a and 5b.  Both figures are included because 
I am not sure how Lindert (1994, 11) treated accident compensation in his calculations for the 
Nordic countries.  Given that Lindert’s USA estimate sits in the lower left of Figure 5b, it seems 
likely that he did not include workplace accident payments in the USA numbers.   Since Lindert 
focused on government spending, this is not a mistake on his part because only a small share of 
U.S. accident compensation came from state government workers’ compensation programs.   If 
we believe that social expenditures should include government mandates for employers to 
provide accident benefits to their workers through workers’ compensation programs, then these 
payments would belong in the comparisons.
12  
Excluding workers’ compensation in Figure 5a, Denmark and cities in Massachusetts are 
clearly the leaders in terms of welfare/unemployment spending in both 1923 and 1930.  Finland, 
Norway, and Sweden rank just below most Massachusetts cities in 1923 and then among the 
Massachusetts cities in 1930.  The picture changes when workers’ compensation payments are 
incorporated into Figure 5b.   The Nordic countries lie in the lower tier of the distribution in the 
early 1920s.  In 1930 Denmark lies in the middle of the distribution, while the other Nordic 
countries remain in the lower tier.  Remember that the comparisons with the Nordic countries  
are not definitive until I find out what Lindert did with injury compensation.  However, the 
comparisons within the United States are all performed the same way.   
                                                 
12I am checking with Peter to see how he treated the accident compensation in his comparisons.  Workers’ 
compensation in the U.S. did not include agricultural workers and domestic servants.  Since the focus in the figures 
is on cities, where there were very few agricultural workers, this should not create too much of a problem  this is not 
a problem.   25 
 
 
Denmark is again the leader in 1930 when we compare per capita health spending in 
1990 dollars in purchasing power parity in the 1920s for the U.S. cities and the Nordic countries 
in Figure 6.  The remaining Nordic countries are in the bottom of the distribution in the early 
1920s.  The U.S. city spending includes per capita city government cost payments to general 
hospitals and hospitals for the insane, feeble-minded, and others as well as per capita state 
hospital spending.  Given the position of Lindert’s circled USA observation in Figure 6, the U.S. 
per capita spending may be understated for the cities because of the exclusive focus on hospitals.  
The main lesson to be drawn from Figure 6 is that there was tremendous variation in government 
spending in hospitals throughout the United States and that the rankings stayed relatively stable 
through the 1920s. 
The entire structure of spending for the maintenance of the poor changed during the Great 
Depression of the 1930s in America.  Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal involved the federal 
government in a series of federal emergency programs designed to aid the unemployed and the 
poor.  It was the first time the federal government had taken responsibility for relief of the poor 
and the unemployed for nonveterans.  Federally funded income maintenance programs like the 
Works’ Progress Administration, Federal Emergency Relief Administration, Civil Works 
Administration, and the Civilian Conservation Corps lasted no later than 1943.  The Social 
Security Act of 1935 established a series of long range programs that included the national old-
age pension system for workers; matching grants to the states for public assistance programs that 
replaced the pre-existing state programs for means-tested old-age assistance, aid to widowed 
mothers, and aid to the blind; and state-funded unemployment insurance programs that received 
some federal funds for administrative costs.  State and local governments still retained 
responsibility for providing income maintenance to others that did not meet these categories. 26 
 
 
 Federal government involvement led to sizeable shifts in the per capita spending for 
relief of the poor and the unemployed.  As can be seen in Figure 7, the amounts spent per capita 
in each city rose dramatically between 1931 and 1940.  These years were chosen because the 
national unemployment rates in the two years were similar.  The unemployment rate in 1931 was 
16.3 percent and 14.8 percent in 1940.  The federal government did not become heavily involved 
in relief efforts until 1933; therefore, the changes wrought by the federal government 
involvement in relief become more obvious in comparing these two years.  Boston, 
Massachusetts and Rochester, New York led the rankings in 1931 at over $82 per head (1990$).  
By 1940 the median expenditure per capita was $179 (1990$) and spending in Boston was 
leading the country at nearly $370 (1990$) per capita on relief. 
Path dependence in per capita relief spending was much weaker across the 1930s than 
across the 1920s.  The tight clustering around the diagonal line seen in Figures 5a and 5b for the 
1920s is no longer present in Figure 7.   The raw correlation is 0.58 in Figure 7 for the 1931/1939 
comparison, compared with 0.89 in Figure 5b for the 1923/1930 comparison.   The impact of 
1931 per capita spending levels on 1939 spending levels is even weaker after we control for the 
state of the economy in the cities in 1931 and 1939.  The elasticities from the regression in Table 
10 show that a city with one percent higher relief spending per capita in 1931 on average had 
relief spending per capita that was only 0.17 percent higher in 1939.  Meanwhile, the per capita 
spending was strongly influenced by changes in the labor market.   The estimated elasticity of -
1.11implies that a one percent reduction in the change in the log of state manufacturing 
employment was associated with a 1.11 percent increase in per capita relief spending.   
The increase in the role of the federal government during the Depression was not the only 
factor that influenced the long run changes in the rankings of state and local government in the 27 
 
 
U.S. over the course of the entire 20
th century.   Figure 8 shows a plot of the maximum weekly 
workers’ compensation payments (1990$) paid to workers injured in temporary accidents in each 
state in 1940 and 1990.  Workers’ compensation benefits were chosen because workers’ 
compensation has always been the responsibility of state governments with no direct role for the 
federal government.  The top weekly benefit payments in 1940 were $235 per week (1990$) in 
Connecticut, South Carolina, New York, and California.   By 1990 many of the states had set up 
rules that adjusted weekly maximums each year in response to changes in average weekly wages 
in the states.  The 1990 rankings of weekly maximums look nothing like the 1940 rankings.  Of 
the leaders in 1940 only Connecticut remains among the leaders in 1990, while South Carolina, 
New York, and California fall below the median.  The correlation between the 1940 and 1990 
weekly maximums was essentially zero.   
   
 
Conclusions 
  My goal has been to document the extent of social expenditures in the U.S. and the 
Nordic Countries in the early 1900s and again in the early 2000s.  A careful look at the extent of 
social expenditures has revealed some surprises.  The common view that America spends much 
less on social welfare than the Nordic countries does not survive closer inspection when we 
consider the differences in the structures of social expenditures.  The standard description of the 
modern era is based on total government social expenditures as a share of GDP that are 
prominently displayed in the OECD statistics and in the datasets freely available at the OECD 
website.  But these are gross transfers that do not take into account the dramatic differences in 
tax structures in the U.S. and the Nordic countries.   The Nordic countries collect income taxes 28 
 
 
on the cash payments made to social welfare recipients at rates that are four to five the rates paid 
by American recipients.  When the poor go out to make purchases, they then pay consumption 
tax rates on their purchases that are 4 to 5 times the rates paid by the poor in America.  Further, 
the American governments offer a series of tax breaks to promote social welfare that are not 
found in the Nordic countries.  As a result, net social expenditures after taxes and transfers as a 
share of GDP in the Nordic countries are much closer to American levels.   
  The picture changes even more dramatically when we look at absolute amounts of 
expenditures.  Such international comparisons are more difficult to measure than shares of GDP 
due to the issues related to measuring purchasing power across countries.   If the adjustments for 
purchasing power are correct, net social expenditures by governments in America are roughly in 
the middle of the Nordic countries.  If we take into account that a significant portion of social 
expenditures in the United States are made privately in the U.S., Americans spend more per 
capita on social welfare than do any of the Nordic countries.   
  The U.S. differs from the Nordic countries in that it is much more willing to allow people 
to choose privately how much to spend on in the social welfare spending categories.  In all of the 
countries, taxes and transfer payments lead to a substantial increase in the equality of income 
after taxes and transfers are incorporated.   Comparisons of Americans and people in the Nordic 
countries at the 10
th percentile of the income distribution show that Americans at the 10
th 
percentile are faring about the same as people in some of the Nordic countries in terms of the 
level of income after taxes and transfers.  Americans in the upper half of the distribution have 
much higher incomes than people in the upper half of the income distribution in the Nordic 
countries.  The unfortunate feature of the American distribution is the low incomes for the people 
below the 10
th percentile of the income distribution.  There are clearly holes in the American 29 
 
 
safety net that people are falling through and the debates about the reasons are ongoing.  We 
know that a substantial number of people eligible for a wide range of benefits in the United 
States either don’t apply for them or do not receive them after applying.   
  Finally, the sheer size of the U.S. economy relative to the Nordic countries likely 
influences the way the U.S. structures its social expenditures.  In the U.S. federal system the 
states make many of the choices about the types and level of benefits to be provided.   Therefore, 
there is enormous diversity across U.S. states and cities in their levels of social expenditures per 
capita as well as incomes per capita.  In terms of income per capita in the early 1900s and again 
in the early 2000s, the Nordic countries look most like states in the American south.   The Nordic 
countries currently have much lower infant mortality rates than the U.S. states, as the Nordic 
countries had more success at cutting infant mortality to levels below 5 infant deaths per live 
birth than the American states.  The jury is still out on the rankings of the Nordic countries and 





Government Social Spending as Percentage of National Product (Welfare--Unemployment, 
Pensions, Health, and Housing), 1880-1930 
1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930
Denmark 0.96 1.11 1.41 1.75  2.71  3.4
Finland  0.66 0.76 0.78 0.9 0.85 2.97
Norway  1.07 0.95 1.24 1.18 1.09 2.39
Sweden 0.72 0.85 0.85 1.03  1.14  2.6
United States  0.29 0.45 0.55 0.56  0.7  0.56
 




Dates of Adoption of Government Social Welfare Programs 
 Denmark  Finland Norway Sweden USA 
Old Age Pensions or 
Assistance 
1891  1937 1936 1913 Federal 1935, States  
see Table 8 
Disability  1921  1937 1936 1913 Some States after 
1942, Federal 1957 
Sickness and 
Maternity 
1892 1963 1909 1891 Elderly  1965, 
Disabled 1972 
Work Injury  1898  1895 1894 1901 1911 and after by 
state, see Table 8 
Unemployment 1907  1917 1906 1934 1935 
Family Allowance  1952  1948 1946 1947 None 
 




Very Rough Estimates of Government Social Spending Per Capita  
in 1990 Dollars, Purchasing Power Parity, 1880-1930 
 
1880 1890  1900 1910 1920 1930
Denmark 21  28  43 65 108 182
Finland 8  10  13 17 16 79
Norway 16  16  23 26 30 87
Sweden 13  18  22 31 32 102
United States  9  15  22 28 39 35
 
Notes.  Percentages from Table 1 multiplied by Angus Maddison’s (2009) estimates of Gross 





Estimates of Social Expenditures as Percentage of Gross Domestic Product at Factor Cost 




1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003
Denmark 33  33.5  32 31 30.5 32.2
Finland 30.5  29 25.5 24.5 25.7
Norway 27  25.5 28 26 28.2
Sweden 41  37  35.5 35.5 35 37.1
United States  17  17  17 16 17 17.4
Net Public 
1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003
Denmark 25  24.5  23 23 22.5 23.7
Finland 23.5  22 20 19.5 20.3
Norway 21  20 23 22.5 22.8
Sweden 31  28  27.5 27.5 27 28.8
United States  17  17  17 16.5 18 18.6
Net Public and Private 
1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003
Denmark 26  25.5  25 25 24.5 25.2
Finland 26  25 23 22.5 23.6
Norway 22  21 24.7 22.5 24.4
Sweden 33  30  29.5 30 29.5 30.9
United States  24  24  24 24 25 27
 
Source and Notes.  OECD (2007, pp. 41, 81-85).   The 2003 figures are provided in the text.  The 
figures for 1993 through 2001 are estimates from reading graphs provided in the text.  Gross 
Public is the most widely reported figure.  Net public adjusts for taxes paid on benefits, 
consumption taxes, and tax breaks.  Net Public and Private adds in net private expenditures 




Rough Estimates of Social Expenditures per Capita in 1990 Purchasing Power Parity Dollars in 
the United States and the Nordic Countries, 1993-2003 
 
Gross Public 
1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003
Denmark 6,227  6,817  6,844 6,899 7,033 7,435
Finland 4,805  5,006 4,808 4,960 5,357
Norway 5,860  6,063 6,852 6,622 7,298
Sweden 6,784  6,554  6,510 7,052 7,312 8,063
United States  4,015  4,183  4,429 4,438 4,829 5,059
Net Public 
1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003
Denmark 4,718  4,986  4,919 5,119 5,188 5,472
Finland 3,702  3,798 3,771 3,948 4,232
Norway 4,558  4,755 5,628 5,730 5,901
Sweden 5,129  4,960  5,043 5,463 5,640 6,259
United States  4,015  4,183  4,429 4,576 5,113 5,408
Net Public and Private 
1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003
Denmark 4,906  5,189  5,347 5,564 5,650 5,818
Finland 4,096  4,315 4,337 4,555 4,920
Norway 4,775  4,993 6,044 5,730 6,315
Sweden 5,460  5,314  5,410 5,960 6,163 6,715
United States  5,668  5,905  6,252 6,656 7,101 7,850
 
Source and Notes.  Calculated by using the percentages in Table 4 multiplied by Angus 
Maddison’s estimates of GDP per capita in GK purchasing power parity dollars.  OECD (2007, 
pp. 41, 81-85).   The 2003 figures are provided in the text.  The figures for 1993 through 2001 
are estimates from reading graphs provided in the text.  Gross Public is the most widely reported 
figure.  Net public adjusts for taxes paid on benefits, consumption taxes, and tax breaks.  Net 




Gini Coefficients for the Income Distribution in the United States and the Nordic Countries, mid 
1970s through mid-2000s. 
 
 
Income Distribution Before Taxes and Transfers 
mid 70s  mid 80s  mid 90s  mid-2000s 
Denmark 0.37 0.42 0.42
Finland 0.34  0.33 0.39 0.39
Norway 0.35 0.4 0.43
Sweden 0.39  0.4 0.44 0.43
United States  0.37  0.4 0.45 0.46
Income Distribution After Taxes and Transfers 
mid 70s  mid 80s  mid 90s  mid-2000s 
Denmark 0.22 0.21 0.23
Finland 0.23  0.21 0.23 0.27
Norway 0.23 0.26 0.28
Sweden 0.21  0.2 0.21 0.23
United States  0.32  0.34 0.36 0.38
 
Source.  OECD.  OECD Stat Extracts downloaded from  http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx   on 






Shares of People with Incomes Below 40 Percent of the Median Income in that Country Before 
and After Direct Taxes and Transfers 
 








Denmark  Before Taxes and Transfers    18.0 22.8  21.3
After Taxes and Transfers   1.8 1.5  2.1
Change   -16.2 -21.3  -19.2
Finland  Before Taxes and Transfers         13.8
After Taxes and Transfers     2.8
Change        -11.0
Norway  Before Taxes and Transfers    16.6 21.7  21.2
After Taxes and Transfers   1.9 3.1  3.5
Change   -14.7 -18.6  -17.7
Sweden  Before Taxes and Transfers  19.8 23.7 26.5  24.1
After Taxes and Transfers   1.3 1.5 2.0  2.5
Change -18.5 -22.2 -24.5  -21.6
United States  Before Taxes and Transfers  19.1 21.3 22.0  21.7
After Taxes and Transfers   10.1 11.8 10.7  11.4
Change -9.0 -9.5 -11.3  -10.3
 
Source:  Extracted statistics from the OECD.Stat website on July 17, 2009.   Adjustments have 






Estimate of Income per Equivalent Person in Households  at the 10th Percentile and 







Finland 9,300  27,100 
Sweden 9,300  27,600 
United 
States   9,500  51,300 
 




Structure of Major Social Insurance and Public Assistance Programs in the United States,  
1900, 1929, and 2000 
 
 
2000     1929     1900
Type Provider  Type  Provider  Type 
General Relief  Local  Indoor   Local Govt 
/Charities 
Indoor 




Temporary Assistance to 
Needy Families 
State with Federal 
Matching Grants 
Mothers' Pensions  45 States    
Need Based Old-Age 
Assistance 
State with Federal 
Matching Grants 





Aid to Blind  State with Federal 
Matching Grants 





Workers' Compensation  Employer Pays 
Premiums to Private 




44 States  Negligence 
Liability 
Health Insurance  Employer/Private  Sickness Insurance  Private    
Health Care for 
Poor/Medicare 
State with Federal 
Matching Grants 








from Employers with 
Federal Paying 
Admin. Expenses 
   None    
Food Stamps  Federal          




Disability Insurance  Federal Social 
Security/Private 




Food Stamps  Federal          
Home Fuel Subsidy  Federal          
Housing Subsidies  Federal  Indoor Relief  Local Govt. 
/Charities 
  
Earned Income Tax 
Credit for Households 
with Children 







The Presence of State Social Welfare Programs in the United States in the Early 1900s 
 
  Workers 
Compensation 
Mothers' Pension Old-Age Pensions  Aid to the Blind 
State Year  Law 
Permanently 
Enacted 
Year Enacted if 
before 1935 when 
Federal Act 
Passed 
Year Enacted if 




Payments as of August 
1, 1935 
Alabama  1919 1931   ---- No
Alaska  1915 1917 1915 No
Arizona  1913 1917 1933 No
Arkansas  1939 1917   ---- Yes
California  1911 1913 1929 Yes
Colorado  1915 1912 1927 Yes
Connecticut  1913 1919   ---- Yes
Delaware  1917 1917 1931 No
Florida  1935 1919   ---- No
Georgia  1920 ----   ---- No
Hawaii  1915 1919 1933 no
Idaho  1917 1913 1931 yes
Illinois  1911 1911   ---- yes
Indiana  1915 1919 1933 yes
Iowa  1913 1913 1934 yes
Kansas  1911 1915   ---- yes
Kentucky  1916 1928 1926 yes
Louisiana  1914 1920   ---- yes40 
 
 
Maine  1915 1917 1933 yes
Maryland  1912 1916 1927 yes
Massachuset
ts 
1911 1913 1930 no
Michigan  1912 1913 1933 no
Minnesota  1913 1913 1929 yes
Mississippi  1948 1928   ---- no
Missouri  1926 1917   ---- yes
Montana  1915 1915 1923 no
Nebraska  1913 1913 1933 yes
Nevada  1913 1913 1925 yes
New 
Hampshire 
1911 1913 1931 yes
New Jersey  1911 1913 1931 yes
New Mexico  1917 1931   ---- no
New York  1913 1915 1930 yes
North 
Carolina 
1929 1923   ---- no
North 
Dakota 
1919 1915 1933 no
Ohio  1911 1913 1933 yes
Oklahoma  1915 1915   ---- yes
Oregon  1913 1913 1933 yes
Pennsylvani
a 
1915 1913 1934 yes






1935 ----   ---- no
South 
Dakota 
1917 1913   ---- no
Tennessee  1919 1915   ---- no
Texas  1913 1917   ---- no
Utah  1917 1913 1929 yes
Vermont  1915 1917   ---- no
Virginia  1918 1918   ---- no
Washington  1911 1913 1933 yes
West 
Virginia 
1913 1915 1931 no
Wisconsin  1911 1913 1925 yes
Wyoming  1915 1915 1929 yes
 
Sources:  Reprinted from Fishback and Thomasson (2006,  2-709).  Workers' Compensation 
Laws:  See Fishback and Kantor (2000).   The date listed above is the date at which a permanent 
law was enacted.  New York passed a compulsory law in 1910 and an elective law in 1910, but 
the compulsory law was declared unconstitutional, and the elective law saw little use.  New York 
passed a compulsory law in 1913 after passing a constitutional amendment.  The Kentucky law 
of 1914 was declared unconstitutional and was replaced by a law in 1916.  The Missouri General 
Assembly passed a workers’ compensation law in 1919, but it failed to receive enough votes in a 
referendum in 1920.  Another law passed in 1921 was defeated in a referendum in 1922 and an 
initiative on the ballot was again defeated in 1924.  Missouri voters finally approved a workers’ 
compensation law in a 1926 referendum on a 1925 legislative act (see Kantor and Fishback 
1994). Maryland (1902) and Montana (1909) passed earlier laws specific to miners that were 
declared unconstitutional. 
Mothers’ pension laws:  For laws enacted prior to 1920, see Thompson, 1919, pp. 7-11 and for 
laws enacted after 1920 see Theda Skocpol (1992, p. 457).  In the states of Missouri (1911), 
(California pre1913), Wisconsin (1912), Michigan (1911), and Oklahoma (1908) there were state 
provisions that provided funds similar to mothers’ pensions in indirect ways.  Some of the 
provisions were limited to specific cities and others were indirect means of providing funds to 
dependent children.  Arizona in a 1914 referendum passed a mothers’ pension and old-age 42 
 
 
pension system that hinged on the abolishment of the almshouses in the state, but it was found 
unconstitutional (Thompson, 1919, pp. 7-9).   More detail on the specifics of mothers’ pension 
laws as of 1934 are available in Stevens 1970, pp. 28-29 and Committee on Economic Security 
1937, pp. 233-249). 
Old-Age Pensions:  See Stevens, 1970, 20-24 and Committee on Economic Security, 1937, pp. 
160-71.  Arizona set up an old-age pension subject to the elimination of almshouses in a 
referendum in 1915, but the pension was declared unconstitutional.  Pennsylvania passed an old-
age pension law in 1923 that was declared unconstitutional in 1924.  Nevada also passed an act 
in 1923 that was replaced by the 1925 act listed above.  Information contained there also offers 
more detailed descriptions of the laws. 
Aid to the Blind:  See “Public Provision for Pensions for the Blind in 1934,” Monthly Labor 





Elasticities from Regressions of the Natural Log of Per Capita Relief Spending in City (1967$) 
in Year t on the Natural Log of Per Capita Relief Spending in 1923 and Change in Log State 
Manufacturing Employment  from 1923 to Year t. 
(t-statistics below each coefficient) 
   ln(per capita poor 
relief) fsc 
   1929  1931 
Natural Log of Per Capita Poor Relief in City in 1923  0.9306 0.948 
22.98 16.62 
Change in Natural log of state manufacturing 
employment from 1923 to year 
-1.482 -2.52 
-2.31 -2.53 
Constant 0.2644 0.3705 
4.5 1.16 
R-squared 0.817 0.68 
Number of Observations  167 147 
 
Sources:  Manufacturing employment from U.S. Bureau of Census (Manufacturing Censuses), 
1929 and 1931;  city per capita poor relief from U.S. Bureau of the Census Financial Statistics of 
Cities (1925c, 1932). 
Table 10 
Elasticities from Regressions of the Natural Log of Per Capita Relief Spending in City (1990$) 
in 1939 on the Natural Log of Per Capita Relief Spending in 1931 and Change in Log State 
Manufacturing Employment from 1931 to 1939. 
 
   Elasticity 
t-statistic 
Per Capita Public Relief in 1931 in 1990$  0.17
6.14 







Sources:  Manufacturing employment from U.S. Bureau of Census (Manufacturing Censuses), 
1929 and 1931; City per capita poor relief in nominal terms from Baird (1942).  They are 
adjusted to 1990 dollars using the 1967 CPI from U.S. Bureau of the Census 1975, series E-135, 44 
 
 
p. 211 and then multiplying by 3.91, which is the CPI conversion factor for 1967 dollars to 1990 




Average Incomes for Each Decile in the Income Distribution  





Ratio of Per Capita Income in 2000 to Per Capita Income in 1920 Plotted Against Per Capita 




















































































Sources and Notes.  U.S. aggregate and Nordic countries circled in red, U..S. states with large 
population shares of Nordic descent boxed in blue.  U.S. and Nordic Countries per capita GDP 
from Madisson Dataset data downloaded on May 5, 2009.  See also Maddison (2003).  U.S. State 
Estimates are calculated by multiplying the U.S. Estimate for Madison by the ratio of personal 
income in the state to the personal income in the entire U.S in that year.  Personal income by 
State for 1920 is from Martin (19??) and from the BEA data set downloaded on May 5, 2009.      
Shares of population born in Nordic countries in 1920 is from the 1920 Population Census and 
the dataset from ICPSR 2896 compiled by Haines (undated).   Information on Iceland was not 




Estimates of Per Capita GDP for U.S. States and Nordic Countries 



































































Infant Mortality Rates for the Years 2000-2005 and 1921 












































Sources:  Data for 1921 for U.S. states is from U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1923b.  Data for 1921 
for the Nordic countries is from Mitchell 1978, 42-3.    Data for mid 2000-2005 from  





Rough Estimates of Per Capita Government Welfare/Unemployment Spending in the early 1920s 
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Sources:  Estimates for the Nordic countries in 1920 and 1930 are based on percentages of 
National Product in 1920 and 1930 from Lindert (1994, 11) multiplied by Maddison’s GDP 
estimates for those years in 1990 GK Purchasing Power Parity Prices.  Estimates for U.S. cities 
are the sum of per capita spending in the city plus per capita spending for the state in 1923 and 
1930 from the U.S. Bureau of the Census’s Financial Statistics of Cities and Financial Statistics 
of States for 1923 and 1930 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1925c, 1925s, 1932c, 1932s).  The 1923 
and 1930 values for the U.S. cities were adjusted to 1990 dollars using the CPI comparisons at 
Officer and Williamson’s Measuring Worth website.  The per capita city spending includes 
governmental cost payments by the city government on outdoor poor relief, poor institutions, 
care of children, other charities, and mothers’ pensions.  The state per capita spending includes 
governmental cost payments for outdoor poor relief, state poor institutions care of children in 
state institutions, care of blind, deaf, and mute in state institutions, other charities in state 
institutions, relief to mothers and relief to all others.  We did not include spending on poor 
institutions all other, care of children all other, care of blind, deaf and mute all other, and other 
charities all other to avoid double-counting if such state spending might have been used to fund 50 
 
 
city spending.   Inclusion of this spending changes the positions in the figure only 




Rough Estimates of Per Capita Government Welfare/Unemployment Spending and Workplace 
Accident Compensation in the early 1920s and 1930 in the Nordic Countries and 248 Cities in  
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Sources:  Estimates for the Nordic countries in 1920 and 1930 are based on percentages of 
National Product in 1920 and 1930 from Lindert (1994, 11) multiplied by Maddison’s GDP 
estimates for those years in 1990 GK Purchasing Power Parity Prices.  Estimates for U.S. cities 
are the sum of per capita spending in the city plus per capita spending for the state plus accident 
compensation in 1923 and 1930  The welfare spending is from the U.S. Bureau of the Census’s 
Financial Statistics of Cities and Financial Statistics of States for 1923 and 1930 (U.S. Bureau of 
the Census 1925c, 1925s, 1932c, 1932s).  The per capita city spending includes governmental 
cost payments by the city government on outdoor poor relief, poor institutions, care of children, 
other charities, and mothers’ pensions.  The state per capita spending includes governmental cost 
payments for outdoor poor relief, state poor institutions care of children in state institutions, care 
of blind, deaf, and mute in state institutions, other charities in state institutions, relief to mothers 
and relief to all others.  We did not include spending on poor institutions all other, care of 
children all other, care of blind, deaf and mute all other, and other charities all other to avoid 
double-counting if such state spending might have been used to fund city spending.   Inclusion of 
this spending changes the positions in the figure only slightly.  County government spending is 
missing.  The worker’s compensation spending is estimated using Fishback and Kantor’s (2000) 
estimates of expected benefits per dollar of annual income (see expben10 in the workers’ 52 
 
 
compensation dataset at Fishback’s website 
http://www.u.arizona.edu/~fishback/Published_Research_Datasets.html .  The expected benefits 
were multiplied by average annual manufacturing earnings for the state reported in the U.S. 
Bureau of the Census, Census of Manufacturing, various years.  The value was then multiplied 
by 0.30, which is the share of the overall population of males aged 15 to 64 participating in the 
labor force at the national level in the 1920s calculated from age statistics and labor force 
statistics in Carter, et. al. 2006,  pp. 1-44 to 1-47 and 2-77.  This is an estimate of compensation 
only and leaves out medical payments for the injured workers and administrative costs for the 
programs.  The 1923 and 1930 values for the U.S. cities were adjusted to 1990 dollars using the 




Rough Estimates of Per Capita Health Spending in U.S. Cities and Nordic Countries in the Early 
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Sources:  Estimates for the Nordic countries in 1920 and 1930 are based on percentages of 
National Product in 1920 and 1930 from Lindert (1994, 13) multiplied by Maddison’s GDP 
estimates for those years in 1990 GK Purchasing Power Parity Prices.  Estimates for U.S. cities 
are the sum of per capita spending in the city plus per capita spending for the state in 1923 and 
1930 from the U.S. Bureau of the Census’s Financial Statistics of Cities and Financial Statistics 
of States for 1923 and 1930 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1925c, 1925s, 1932c, 1932s).  The 1923 
and 1930 values for the U.S. cities were adjusted to 1990 dollars using the CPI comparisons at 
Officer and Williamson’s Measuring Worth website.  The per capita city spending includes 
governmental cost payments by the city government on general hospitals and hospitals for the 
insane.  The state per capita spending includes governmental cost payments for state general 
hospitals and state special hospitals for the insane, feeble-minded, and all others.  We did not 
include spending on state spending for hospitals not listed as state institutions to avoid double-
counting if such state spending might have been used to fund city spending.   Inclusion of this 








































































































































Source and notes.  Data are from Baird (1942).  They are adjusted to 1990 dollars using the 1967 
CPI from U.S. Bureau of the Census 1975, series E-135, p. 211 and then multiplying by 3.91, 
which is the CPI conversion factor for 1967 dollars to 1990 dollars from Officer and 
Williamson’s Measuring Wealth website.  Per capita relief spending includes spending from 
federal, state, and local sources.  It includes direct relief payments, work relief payments, and 
public assistance through old-age assistance, aid-to-the-blind, and aid to dependent child 






























































Source.  These are the maximum weekly payments to workers with temporary injuries under the 
workers’ compensation in each law.  The original values are the values in 1967 dollars reported 
in Allen (2004, 197-8).  They are adjusted to 1990 dollars by multiplying by 3.91, which is the 
CPI conversion factor from 1967 dollars to 1990 dollars from Officer and Williamson’s 
Measuring Wealth website.   Allen (2004) shows that a large majority of American workers who 




Taxes and Tax Breaks in Sweden and the United States 
 
 
The following tables for Sweden and the United States are reproduced from OECD 
(2007, 78 and 80) to show the direct taxation on benefits paid, the indirect taxes paid for 
consumption, and the nature of tax breaks in the countries.  This is the information that the 
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